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Abstract
The housing market setting constitutes a fundamental model of exchange
economies of goods. Most of the work concerning housing markets does not
cater for randomized assignments or allocation of time-shares. House allocation
with fractional endowments of houses was considered by Athanassoglou and
Sethuraman (2011) who posed the open problem whether individual rationality,
weak strategyproofness, and efficiency are compatible for the setting. We show
that the three axioms are incompatible.
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1. Introduction
The housing market is a fundamental model of exchange economies of goods.
It has been used to model online barter markets and nation-wide kidney mar-
kets [11, 14]. The housing market (also called the Shapley-Scarf market) consists
of a set of agents each of whom owns a house and has preferences over the set
of houses. The goal is to redistribute the houses among the agents in an effi-
cient and stable manner. The desirable properties include the following ones:
Pareto optimality (there exists no other assignment which each agent weakly
prefers and at least one agent strictly prefers); individual rationality (the resul-
tant allocation is at least as preferred by each agent as his endowment); and
core stability (there exists no subset of agents who could have redistributed their
endowments among themselves so as to get a more preferred outcome than the
resultant assignment).
Shapley and Scarf [13] showed that for housing markets with strict pref-
erences, an elegant mechanism called Gale’s Top Trading Cycles (TTC) (that
is based on multi-way exchanges of houses between agents) is strategyproof
and finds an allocation that is in the core [13, 8].1 Along with the Deferred
Email address: haris.aziz@unsw.edu.au (Haris Aziz)
1The seminal paper of Shapley and Scarf [13] was referenced prominently in the scientific
background document of the 2012 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory
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Acceptance Algorithm, TTC has provided the foundations for many of the de-
velopments in matching market design [9, 14]. The Shapley-Scarf market has
been used to model important real-world problems for allocation of human or-
gans and seats at public schools. Since the formalization of TTC, considerable
work has been done to extend and generalize TTC for more general domains
that allow indifference in preferences [1, 5, 3, 10, 12] or multiple units in endow-
ment [4, 7, 15, 16].
Despite recent progress on house allocation and housing market mechanisms,
the general assumption has remained that agents cannot own or be allocated
fractions of houses. The disadvantage of this assumption is that it does not
model various cases where agents have fractional endowments or when agents
can share houses. This is especially the case when agents have the right to
use different facilities for different fractions of the time and fractional alloca-
tion of resources is helpful in obtaining more equitable outcomes. Allowing for
exchanges of fractions of services can also be helpful in modeling time-bank
models in which agents performs services in order to receive other services for
the same time duration. Fractional allocation of houses can also be interpreted
as the relative right of an agent over a house [2]. Finally, fractional alloca-
tions can be used to model randomized allocation of indivisible resources where
agents exchange probabilities of getting particular houses. Hence allocation of
houses under fractional endowments generalizes a number of well-studied house
allocation models.
Athanassoglou and Sethuraman [2] considered housing markets with frac-
tional endowments and presented a desirable mechanism for the setting. They
posed the following open question regarding housing markets with fractional
endowments: “a natural question to ask is whether there exists a mechanism
that is individually rational, ordinally efficient, and weakly strategyproof.” In
this paper, we answer the open question posed by Athanassoglou and Sethura-
man [2] in the negative by presenting an impossibility result. The result implies
a number of results in the literature including theorems in [2, 17]. The result
also shows that as soon the Shapley-Scarf housing market allows for fractional
endowments, the compatibility of individual rationality, Pareto optimality, and
strategyproofness disappears.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Model
Consider a market with a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n} and a set of houses
H = {h1, . . . , hm}. Each agent has complete and transitive preferences %i over
the houses and %= (%1, . . . ,%n) is the preference profile of the agents. Agents
may be indifferent among houses. We denote %i: E
1
i , . . . , E
ki
i for each agent i
with equivalence classes in decreasing order of preference. Thus, each set Eji is
of Alfred Nobel given to Lloyd Shapley and Alvin Roth.
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a maximal equivalence class of houses among which agent i is indifferent, and
ki is the number of equivalence classes of agent i. An agent has dichotomous
preferences if he considers each house as either acceptable or unacceptable and is
completely indifferent between unacceptable houses and also indifferent between
acceptable houses.
Each agent i is endowed with an allocation e(i) where there are e(i)(hj)
units of house hj given to agent i. The quadruple (N,H,%, e) is an instance of
a housing market with fractional endowments. Note that in the basic housing
market, each agent is endowed with and is allocated one house and the endow-
ments are discrete: n = m, e(i)(hj) ∈ {0, 1} and
∑
h∈H e(i)(h) = 1 for all i ∈ N
and
∑
i∈N e(i)(h) = 1 for all h ∈ H . When allocations are discrete we will also
abuse notation and denote e(i) as a set.
A fractional assignment is an n×m matrix [x(i)(hj)]1≤i≤n,1≤j≤m such that
for all i ∈ N , and h ∈ H ,
∑
i∈N x(i)(h) =
∑
i∈N e(i)(h). The value x(i)(hj) is
the fraction or units of house hj that agent i gets. We will use fraction or unit
interchangeably since we do not assume that exactly one unit of each house is in
the market. Each row x(i) = (x(i)(h1), . . . , x(i)(hm)) represents the allocation
of agent i. Given two allocations x(i) and x(j), x(i)+x(j) is the point-wise sum
of the allocations x(i) and x(j). If
∑
i∈N x(i)(h) = 1 for each h ∈ H , a fractional
assignment can also be interpreted as a random assignment where x(i)(hj) is
the probability of agent i getting house hj. Note that endowment e itself can
be considered as the initial assignment of houses to the agents with e(i) being
the initial allocation of agent i ∈ N . A fractional housing market mechanism is
a function that takes as input (N,H,%, e) and returns an assignment or vector
of allocations (x(1), . . . , x(n)) such that
∑
i∈N x(i) =
∑
i∈N e(i). We do not
require in general that
∑
i∈N e(i)(h) or
∑
h∈H e(i)(h) are integers.
Example 1 (Illustration of a housing market with fractional endowments).
Consider the following housing market (N,H,%, e) where N = {1, 2, 3} and
H = {a, b, c}. The endowment assignment and the preferences are as follows:
e =


0 0.99 0.01
0.99 0 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.98

 .
1 : a, c, b 2 : b, a, c 3 : b, a, c
The endowment assignment specifies that agent 1 owns 0.99 fraction of b and
0.01 fraction of c.
2.2. Properties of allocations and mechanisms
Before defining various stability and efficiency properties, we need to reason
about agents’ preferences over allocations. A standard method to compare
random allocations is to use the SD (stochastic dominance) relation. Given two
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random assignments x and y, x(i) %SDi y(i) i.e., an agent i SD prefers allocation
x(i) to y(i) if
∀h ∈ H :
∑
hj∈{hk:hk%ih}
x(i)(hj) ≥
∑
hj∈{hk:hk%ih}
y(i)(hj).
The SD relation is not complete in general. We define normative properties
of allocations as well as mechanisms.
• SD-efficiency: an assignment x is SD-efficient if there exists no other
assignment y such that y(i) %SDi x(i) for all i ∈ N and y(i) ≻
SD
i x(i) for
some i ∈ N .
• SD individually rational (SD-IR): an assignment x is SD-individually ra-
tional if x(i) %SDi e(i).
• A mechanism f is SD-manipulable iff there exists an agent i ∈ N and
preference profiles % and %′ with %j=%
′
j for all j 6= i such that f(%
′)
≻SDi f(%). A mechanism is weakly SD-strategyproof iff it is not SD-
manipulable.
3. The result
We show that there does not exist an SD-efficient, SD-individually rational
and weak SD-strategyproof mechanism. The theorem below answers a question
raised by Athanassoglou and Sethuraman [2].
Theorem 1. There does not exist a weak SD-strategyproof, SD-efficient and
SD-individually rational fractional housing market mechanism even for single
unit allocations and endowments, and for strict preferences.
Proof. Consider the housing market (N,H,%, e) where N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, H =
{h1, h2, h3, h4, h5}, the preference profile % is
%1: h3, h1, h2, h4, h5
%2: h5, h1, h2, h3, h4
%3: h1, h4, h2, h3, h5
%4: h2, h4, h1, h3, h5
%5: h5, h3, h1, h2, h4
and
e =


1/2 1/2 0 0 0
0 0 1/2 0 1/2
1/2 0 0 1/2 0
0 1/2 0 1/2 0
0 0 1/2 0 1/2


.
First we can establish the claim that agents 3, 4, 5 get exactly their endow-
ment as long as the following conditions hold:
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A the allocation is SD-IR.
B agents 3, 4, and 5 report truthfully.
C agent 2 reports h4 as his least preferred house.
D agent 2 reports h5 as his most preferred house.
E agent 1 expresses h4 as a house less preferred than h1, h2, h3.
We argue for the claim as follows. Suppose the allocation is
a =


a11 a12 a13 a14 a15
a21 a22 a23 a24 a25
a31 a32 a33 a34 a35
a41 a42 a43 a44 a45
a51 a52 a53 a54 a55


.
Since h5 is the most preferred house of agent 2 (Assumption D) and agent 5
(truthful preference of agent 5 according to Assumption B) who also happen
to hold 0.5 each of h5, SD-IR of allocation a implies that a25 = a55 = 0.5 and
a15 = a35 = a45 = 0. House h4 is the second most preferred house of agents
3 and 4 and they get 0.5 of their second most preferred house and 0.5 of their
most preferred house. If agent 3 or agent 4 get an SD-improvement over their
endowment, then they must get less of h4 and more of their most preferred house.
However, due to B, E, and the assumption that agent 5 reports truthfully, no
agent among 1, 2, and 5 can take any fraction of h4 or else SD-IR is violated.
Hence, a34 = a44 = 0.5 and a14 = a24 = a54 = 0. Since h1 is the most preferred
house of agent 3 and her allocation of h4 is fixed, it follows from SD-IR that
a31 = 0.5. Hence a(3) = e(3). Since h2 is the most preferred house of agent 4
and her allocation of h4 is fixed, it follows from SD-IR that a42 = 0.5. Hence
a(4) = e(4). It remains to be established that a53 = 0.5. Since a55 = 0.5 is
already fixed and since h3 is the next most preferred house of agent 5 after
house h5, SD-IR implies that a53 = 0.5. Thus a(5) = e(5) and we have proved
the claim.
From now on, we will consider a preference profile in which the conditions
above are met so that by SD-IR, we get that agents 3, 4, 5 get exactly their
endowments.
Assuming that agents 3, 4, 5 get the same allocation as their endowment,
agent 1 must get 1/2 of h3 in any SD-efficient assignment. Thus the only
SD-individually rational and SD-efficient assignments for profiles satisfying the
conditions above:
x =


1/2 0 1/2 0 0
0 1/2 0 0 1/2
1/2 0 0 1/2 0
0 1/2 0 1/2 0
0 0 1/2 0 1/2


,
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and
z =


λ 1/2− λ 1/2 0 0
1/2− λ λ 0 0 1/2
1/2 0 0 1/2 0
0 1/2 0 1/2 0
0 0 1/2 0 1/2


for 0 ≤ λ < 1/2.
If the outcome is assignment x, then agent 2 can report %′
2
:
%1: h3, h1, h2, . . .
%′2: h5, h1, h3, h2, h4
The only SD-individually rational and SD-efficient outcome of (%1,%
′
2
,%3,%4
,%5) is assignment y which is an SD-improvement for agent 2 over the truthful
outcome x.
If the outcome is of type assignment z, then agent 1 can report %′
1
:
%′1: h1, h3, h2, . . .
%2: h5, h1, h2, h3, h4
The only SD-individually rational and SD-efficient outcome of (%′
1
,%2,%3,%4
,%5) is assignment x which is an SD-improvement for agent 1 over the truthful
outcome z.
We also get as corollaries previous impossibility results in the literature:
Corollary 1 (Theorem 4, Yilmaz [17]). There does not exist an SD-IR, SD-
efficient, weak SD-strategyproof, and weak SD-envy-free fractional housing mar-
ket mechanism.
Corollary 2 (Theorem 2, Athanassoglou and Sethuraman [2]). There does not
exist an SD-IR, SD-efficient, weak justified envy-free and weak SD-strategyproof
fractional housing market mechanism.
Corollary 3 (Theorem 3, Athanassoglou and Sethuraman [2]). There does not
exist an SD-IR, SD-efficient, and SD-strategyproof fractional housing market
mechanism.
We remark that the three properties used in Theorem 1 are independent from
each other. SD-efficiency and weak SD-strategypoofness can be simultaneously
satisfied by the multi-unit eating probabilistic serial mechanism [6] if preferences
are strict. SD-individual rationality and weak SD-strategyproofness (even SD-
strategyproofness) are satisfied by the mechanism that returns the endowment.
SD-individual rationality and SD-efficiency can be satisfied by imposing linear
constraints for SD-IR and then maximizing sum of utilities that are consistent
with the ordinal preferences.
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